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本研究采用语用论辩学分析中国政府回应
美国政府批评中国人权状况的论辩话语，旨在
探讨中方如何通过论证来反对美方的霸权。本
研究以中国国务院新闻办公室（“国新办”）
在 1995 到 1997 年间发布的三篇官方文件“评
美国国务院《人权报告》”为研究文本，通过
分析其中的论证结论（立场）、论证内容（理
由）、论证结构和论证图式发现国新办在上述
四个方面的论证策略。通过分析，研究者发现：
1）在立场上，国新办并不同意美方《人权报告》
 This paper, adopting pragma-dialectical approach, analyses the Chinese government’s 
argumentative discourse in response to the 
accusation of its human rights practices by 
American government, in order to explore the 
former’s argumentation in resistance to 
America’s hegemony. It takes “Comment on 
Country Report of Human Rights Practices by 
the U.S. Department of State”, three pieces of 
official documents issued by Information Office 
of State Council of China (“IOSC”) from 1995 to 
1997, as the research texts. It analyses the 
claim (standpoint), argument (reason), argument 
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中一些部分所说的中国存在人权违规的观点；
2）在论证内容上，国新办主要提供了四类理由，
分别是：美方的人权报告存在歪曲中国人权的
情况；美方忽略了中国政府在人权上取得进步
的事实；也无视其自身严重的人权违规现象；
美方对中国人权的指责是其霸权本质的体现。
3）在论证结构上，就人权事宜，中方属于非混
合的复杂论辩类型，其内部的复合、并列和嵌
入型类别又相互结合；4）在论证图式上，国新
办的人权话语主要以征兆型论证为主。本研究
从论辩的视角对发展中国家对外人权话语的改
进提供实践价值。 
[关键词] 论证；人权；语用论辩；论证结构 
structure and scheme to find out the 
argumentative strategies of IOSC in these four 
aspects. It was found that: 1) in terms of 
standpoint, IOSC denied the view of U.S. side 
that China had human rights abuses in some 
parts of its Country Report; 2) in terms of 
argument, IOSC mainly provided four types of 
reasons: the U.S. counterpart distorted China’s 
domestic human rights practices in some cases, 
neglected the progress of human rights the 
Chinese government had made, took a blind eye 
to America’s own severe human rights violations, 
and American government’s accusation through 
Country Report was the embodiment of 
hegemony; 3) As to the argument structure, the 
Chinese government adopted non-mixed complex 
argumentation with their various types of 
multiple, coordinate and subordinate structure 
in combination on human rights issue; 4) in 
terms of argument scheme, IOSC mainly adopted 
symptomatic scheme in its discourse. The study 
provides practical values for the improvement 
of a development country’s international human 
rights discourse in the argumentative lens. 
Key words: argumentation; human rights; 
pragmatic-dialectics; argumentation structure 
Since China released its first white paper, a type of official 
documents which represents a state’s stance and attitude towards a 
particular and significant issue (Xie, 2005), Chinese Human Rights, it has 
become a common practice in the last 25 years for the Chinese government 
to introduce, clarify and defend its human rights practices to the world and 
the UN in response to outsiders’ curiosity, misunderstanding and bias, 
particularly those from western countries led by the U.S.. The practice 
dates back to the fact that the U.S. Department of State has been yearly 
issuing Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (hereafter “Country 
Report”) since 1970s, demonstrating the human rights “abuses” of other 
countries worldwide, in which China is also included later. Based on these 
reports, the U.S. government politicalized human rights issues through 
imposing financial, trade sanctions and even military interference on those 
states with “poor” human rights conditions (Dong, 2000). Against such 
backdrop, Information Office of State Council of China (hereafter “IOSC”) 
each year argues back by introducing its human rights, revealing the faulty 
aspects of Country Report (China section), and demonstrating the human 
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rights abuses of the U.S., which are released in the form of official 
documents⎯Chinese Human Rights, ‘Comment on Country Report’ and the 
current Human Rights Record of the United States respectively. 
Such human rights controversy among developing countries and 
western developed countries is a typical case of international political 
argumentative practices in which a state actor proposes a claim and 
supports its claim with evidence and rebuts the challenges from other 
actors. The UN state members propose and discuss the human rights 
problems of a member state and make policies to solve them in regular 
sessions held by the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. The political 
deliberation is one domain in which argumentation is practiced (van 
Eemeren et al., 2014: 559).  For instance, the U.S. representatives 
proposed since 1990 to evaluate China’s human rights due to the latter’s 
human rights violations in the regular sessions in the UN. In order to refute 
and dismiss such proposal, the Chinese government representatives argued 
by demonstrating China’s progress of human rights (Wu & Zhu, 2015: 
192-204). Thereby, human rights argumentation constitutes a representative 
political discourse in the international communication. 
On the other hand, the analysis of argumentation, that is, how the 
argumentation as ideological device is served for the communicators’ 
purpose, is also increasingly needed in critical discourse analysis (CDA). As 
one of the main domain of CDA, the political discourse (Chilton, 2004; 
Fairclough, 2003; Hart, 2015; van Dijk, 2000) has always been focused on, 
in Amossy’s (2009a) term, the “thick” linguistic descriptions as the 
linguistic realization of power, ideology and control. What is limited in 
certain aspects is the systematic and comprehensive argumentative 
dimension in analysis, which is “the inherent feature of discourse” and 
integrated into the “fabric of the text and verbally elaborated” (Amossy, 
2009a: 254). As van Dijk (2000) argues, the argumentation (in terms of 
content and form), particularly its content needs to be addressed given its 
ideological power. The analysis of argumentative content, its structure and 
schemes, to me, could be included in CDA as they may enrich the 
argumentation representation in it. Thereby, it seems to be possible to 
address the argumentative aspect in CDA. Meanwhile, pragma-dialectical 
approach in the field of argumentation studies to my knowledge could 
provide an alternative for the enrichment of the systematic representation 
of argumentation in CDA by taking both reasoning and language aspects of 
discourse practices (see Ouyang & Jin, 2016; van Eemeren, 2010; van 
Eemeren et al., 2002; Wu, 2015). 
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Given such consideration and the advantage of pragma-dialectics, 
this study will combine pragma-dialectical approach to CDA, and 
exemplifies its potential values as the complementation of the latter 
through the analysis of IOSC’s argumentative strategies in its institutional 
discourse refuting the U.S. government’s report on China’s human rights 
abuses. It needs to clarify that this study aims not to evaluate the Chinese 
government’s human rights discourse or its stance on human rights, but to 
provide a constructive perspective to represent its human rights 
argumentation in order to understand and improve its human rights 
practice. I try to argue that argumentation can be generally speaking a 
useful device for those dominated groups (less powerful groups) if 
employed reasonably to challenge or resist to the power abuse of dominant 
ones (more powerful ones).  
I will present the problems of imbalance between language and 
argumentation in CDA in Section One, which lays the preconditions for the 
integration of the two. In Section Two the advantage of pragma-dialectical 
approach will be detailed compared with CDA in terms of reasoning and 
language aspects, which is followed by a case study of the Chinese 
government’s argumentative discourse in Section Three and Four. 
1. The Problem of CDA: Imbalance Between Language and 
Argumentation 
To my understanding, there seems to be imbalance between the 
linguistic description and argumentation in CDA as close attention is paid to 
linguistic patterns. CDA discloses the power, hegemony and ideology 
underlying the discursive practices and the relation between discourse and 
power and ideology. For instance, at the text level and discursive practice 
of the three-dimensional model of Fairclough (1992, 2003), the order of 
discourse (structural analysis) and intertextuality are detailed for the 
production of meaning as construction of the society. It is the same for van 
Dijk’s socio-cognitive model in which linguistic structures and form are 
identified as ideological devices for positive US presentation and negative 
OTHER presentation. The former includes genre, difference, voices (in 
intertextuality), assumptions, semantic/grammatical relations between 
sentences and clauses, and between words as well, speech function and 
mood, rhetoric, representation of social events and style (Fairclough, 
2003); the latter covers the ideological discourse structure, i.e., meaning, 
propositional structures, sentence syntax and discourse forms, rhetoric, 
style (lexicalization), action and interaction (van Dijk, 2000). Similar 
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linguistic oriented analysis is also observed in Wodak’s discourse-historical 
approach (Angouri & Wodak, 2014; Wodak & Boukala, 2015). Thus, it can be 
observed that text description both covers from the smallest unit of lexicon 
to the complete whole text or conversation as a genre. It also distinguishes 
itself from other discourse analysis approaches, such as Laclau and Mouffe’s 
discourse theory (see Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002) which is more abstract 
without language focus. 
What CDA fail to address may be the argumentative nature of 
discourse. The conception of argumentation could be understood from a 
broad perspective, in which discourses with non-argumentative aims, 
provide factual information or create a fictional world (Amossy & Aviv, 
2002; Grize, 1990). That is because discourses as such still belong to the 
domain of persuasion insofar they try to orient the audience’s ways of 
looking at and judging the world (Amossy & Aviv, 2002). In this dimension, 
argumentation is regarded as a process aiming at influencing one’s opinion, 
attitude and even behaviour (Grize, 1990), no matter how far its verbal 
means deviate from the norm of argumentative discourse with claim and 
support. In other words, the usual non-argumentative discourse like news 
reports, diary, novels and letters, all could be understood from 
argumentative dimension, instead of being excluded and dismissed by the 
narrow delimitation of justification and refutation or persuasion in rhetoric 
and dialectical approach. 
In contrast to the rich description of linguistic feature, there seems to 
be little systematic analysis of argumentation with argument 
reconstruction in CDA. For example, Fairclough (2003: 81-83) adopts 
abstract Toulmin model in his analysis of argument structure without 
texturing of the arguments due to the difficulty that its elements (e.g., 
warrant and backing) are often implicit, taken for granted and assumed. 
For him, assumption is regarded as logical implication and he suggests 
‘voice’ as such implement to abstract argumentative analysis. 
Argumentation in van Dijk’s (1992, 2000) approach is limited to the explicit 
discourse structure filled with standpoints and reasons like editorials. He 
specifies three types of argument schemes: authority (as evidentiality or 
voice), illustration (example) and number games (statistics). Van Leeuwen 
and Wodak’s (1999) legitimation also involves argumentative elements, such 
as authorization, rationalization, moral evaluation and mythopoesis, in 
which the latter two are more close to Amossy’s understanding of 
argumentation without obvious argumentative aim. 
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In sum, there may be, to me, a limited understanding of such 
argumentative nature of discourse with non-argumentative structure (e.g., 
diary) and a lack of more systematic description of argumentation (in 
arguments, argumentation structure and scheme etc.) compared with the 
detailed analysis of linguistic aspects in CDA. 
However, the situation of such conception and analysis of 
argumentation is changing recently in CDA. Argumentation in political 
domain, particularly deliberation and practical argumentation attract 
increasing attention in political discourse analysis. For instance, Fairclough 
and Fairclough (2011, 2012) argue that political discourse is in nature 
argumentative in support of or in opposition to particular way of acting as 
ground for decision over several possibilities. They thus suggest that the 
analysis of texts should “focus on the general features of whole texts” 
instead of isolated textual features, and “non-argumentative genres 
(narrative and explanation)” should also be examined “in relation to 
arguments in which they are embedded” (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012: 
1). This interdisciplinary collaboration between discourse analysis and 
argumentation also echoes Amossy’s (2009a) initiation of argumentation in 
discourse and Ramírez’s (2013) argument for a bridge between “the 
paradigms of CDA” and “French Discourse Analysis and Argumentative 
Analysis”. Van den Hoven (2015) further proposes rhetorical discourse 
analysis combining narrative, argumentation and contrast in his analysis of 
discourse with multimodality. 
Therefore, it seems to be natural and possible to integrate CDA and 
argumentation in order to bridge the distance between the two separate 
disciplines and to overcome their own limitations in which the former lean 
towards isolated local linguistic means and the latter disregards its textual 
realization in communication. Differing from Amossy’s (2009a, 2009b), 
Ramírez’s (2013) and van den Hoven’s (2015) approach, I would like to 
suggest van Eemeren’s pragma-dialectics to overcome the limitations 
mentioned above, which has the advantage the previous three ones cannot 
enjoy. 
2. Advantage of Pragma-Dialectics: Integration Between 
Argumentation and Language 
The pragma-dialectical approach balances both macro-structure 
through its argumentation reconstruction and micro texturing realization of 
arguments though strategic manoeuvring. The macro-structure of 
argumentation reconstruction consists of four stages of confrontation, the 
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opening, argumentation and the concluding as a template of heuristic and 
analytic tool (van Eemeren et al., 2002, 2014). In the confrontation stage, 
different opinions (standpoints) are manifested; in the opening stage, the 
parties agree upon their division of discussion roles of protagonist and 
antagonist, and identify their commitment (common starting point); in the 
argumentation stage, each actor advances, challenges and defends his 
(her) argument, and evaluates the quality of arguments, which constitutes 
the significant part of critical discussion; in the concluding stage, 
differences of opinions are resolved in favour of protagonist or antagonist 
by defending against critical responses or failing to defend (summarizing 
the results in attempt to solve differences of opinions), and either 
protagonist or antagonist, thereby, withdraws his (her) standpoint. 
On the other hand, strategic maneuvering can be understood, 
according to van Eemeren et al. (2014: 553), as “a rhetoric dimension” of 
this theory. As one aspect of strategic maneuvering, “the exploitation of 
presentational devices” means “the examination of the stylistic and other 
means of expression” serving the purpose of effective communication (van 
Eemeren et al., 2014: 554). Although the strategic maneuvering is more 
closely related to logos and pathos it does not need to be limited to rhetoric 
perspective. Instead, it can be extended to other disciplines, such as 
dialogue study, pragmatics and discourse analysis (van Eemeren, 2010: 96). 
Strategic maneuvering can be extended to include linguistic devices as 
what van Haaften demonstrated (see Ouyang & Jin, 2016).  
3. Materials and Methods 
 In order to examine the argumentative strategies of the Chinese 
government, the paper selects IOSC’s three official documents named 
“Comment on Country Report of Human Rights Practices (China section)” 
(hereafter “CCR”) in 1995, 1996 and 1997 as materials. They were the 
response to the accusation of China’s human rights abuse in the U.S. official 
report Country Report of Human Rights (China section) released by the 
State Department. The retrieval of these official articles is from the web 
version of CCR under the category of important documents in Yearbook of 
Chinese Human Rights (1949-1999) under the item “yearbook” in China 
National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) (http://nianjian.cnki.net/) full 
text database.  
The reason to choose these CCRs as materials is that they signify a 
change of the Chinese government’s response to the U.S. government’s 
human rights accusation, i.e., directly rebutting the content of American 
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government’s Country Report, instead of self-reporting China’s own 
domestic human rights conditions in white paper Chinese Human Rights in 
the early 1990s. Such a discursive change also indicates what Shi (2013) 
argues China moved from a passive recipient to an active speaker on human 
right issues; such argumentation on human rights is as an increasing 
counter-hegemonic discourse in resistance to overwhelming discourse of 
western countries. Additionally, the Chinese official discourse on human 
rights as such represents, to some degree, a typically progressive and 
argumentative model of the Chinese side when the government 
communicates with international communities based on its numerous 
heated exchanges with the U.S. side (Zhao, 2006a, 2006b). 
As this study explores how the Chinese government argue with the 
U.S. counterpart on China’s human rights, that is, what arguments, 
standpoint, argument structure and scheme IOSC employs for the challenge 
of the U.S. government’s accusation of China’s human rights violation and 
also given the advantage of pragma-dialectics, I propose to integrate 
pragma-dialectics with CDA, particularly the reconstruction of arguments as 
analysis object (owing to the space pressure, I will not examine its micro 
linguistic realization) for the purpose of description of IOSC’s 
argumentative discourse and its resistance to the hegemony concerning 
human rights issue. Specifically, I identify the four stages of critical 
discussion employed by IOSC through the analysis of the confrontation, 
opening, argumentation and closing stage in CCRs. The identification of the 
four stages is operationalized on the reconstruction transformations (the 
specific analytic operations, van Eemeren et al., 2014: 535) of deletion, 
addition, permutation and substitution of IOSC’s human rights discourse. 
4. Argumentation Reconstruction in “Comment on Country Report 
of Human Rights Practices” 
In the confrontation stage, the standpoint of the Chinese government 
is that Country Report of American State Department was not the authentic 
description of China’s human rights, rather it was the embodiment of the 
power politics of the U.S., in which the latter “criticized the political system” 
and “destroyed the social stability in China” through promoting human rights 
of the Chinese citizens based on the analysis of CCRs. This was because some 
of the human rights violations listed in Country Report did not reflect the 
actual conditions of China’s human rights. According to van Eemeren et al. 
(2002), a standpoint is indicated by some linguistic indicators (so, thereby, 
etc.) and the context of speech. For example, at the very beginning IOSC 
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stated, “[t]he report, while full of empty slanderous words, […] They [these 
‘cases’] are either based on rumours or deliberately fabricated, with no 
truth in it” (CCR, 1995), and “it reveals the true face of American 
government, interfering other countries’ domestic affairs in the name of 
preserving human rights and practicing power politics” (CCR, 1996). Given 
the long human rights debates between China and the U.S., the U.S. yearly 
releases human rights reports of other countries presenting human rights 
abuses, and many countries (e.g., Russia, Vietnam, China, Singapore and 
other developing countries etc.) protest American government’s human 
rights reports. The Chinese side undoubtedly protested and resisted 
America’s human rights diplomacy of Bush and Clinton government 
throughout 1990s (Hong & Dong, 2003). The refutation of the Country 
Report was probably part of such Sino-U.S. human rights struggle.  
Thereby, for the different opinions between the Chinese government 
and American counterpart concerning whether Chinese human rights was 
abused or not, the Chinese side takes a standpoint of denying, i.e., the 
Chinese government did not make those human rights violations as typically 
and distortedly exemplified in the U.S. government’s County Report, rather 
the report had been part of the embodiment of the American government’s 
power politics of interfering other states’ domestic affairs. 
In the opening stage in this case, IOSC took the role of antagonist of 
refutation as it was against American counterpart’s argument of China’s 
human rights abuse and proved such argument wrong and invalid, based on 
which IOSC further proposed its argument of America’s power politics in the 
name of protecting human rights. In the opening stage, the antagonist will 
challenge and rebut the argument of the protagonist (van Eemeren et al. 
2002). According to van Eemeren et al. (2002: 25), a protagonist usually 
proposes and defends his (her) standpoint for challenges, while an 
antagonist challenges the standpoint and arguments of the protagonist. 
Based on the definition, we could infer the role of protagonist was occupied 
by American State Department as it proposed its standpoint first, i.e., 
China had human rights abuse problems; the U.S. side as the main 
counterpart and addressee of the Chinese side, could also be observed by 
IOSC’s name for the U.S. as “human right judge,” or “Country Report” or 
“the U.S. State Department” in CCRs.  
It needs to mention that for the similar standpoint of Chinese human 
rights violation, the role of protagonist was likely to be extended to cover 
many western developed countries, including those European countries, 
Australia, not limited to the U.S.. This is obviously due to the fact that 
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these countries showed similar human rights stances as the U.S. did, which 
was demonstrated in their yearly anti-China human rights proposals 
initiated by the U.S. in the UN for the examination of China’s human rights 
due to its abuses in 1990s (Dong, 2000). However, the Chinese side in this 
case did not note other western countries in its CCRs and only responded to 
American counterpart’s accusation, it is therefore assumed that America as 
the protagonist here in the current case. 
Given the starting point in pragma-dialectics as “the fact or value 
judgement assumed or confirmed by the protagonist and the antagonist” 
(Wu & Zhu, 2015: 58), IOSC’s starting point in CCRs, seems to follow the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations General Assembly, 
1948), the UN Charter and principle of independence and sovereignty, 
non-interference of domestic affairs of a state as the common practice of 
international communication, of which non-interference is also applied to 
human rights issue and other UN members as well. The starting point as 
such is probably based on the historical context. As China and the U.S. are 
the founding members of the UN, and both drafted Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and China also signed 25 international agreements on human 
rights till 2010 (Chen & Tian, 2010), these actions in a way imply that the 
two states share the values underlying human rights (such as respect for life 
and dignity and equality). Also, China and the U.S. both acknowledge the 
universality of human rights (Li, 2005). Thereby, it could be assumed that 
these universal principles and rules in the UN are also applied for all its 
members as the basis of dealing with international issues among countries 
(although I admit that some countries did not adhere to them in reality). 
Some of these values were also observed in CCRs in 1995 that “[e]very state 
has an inalienable right to choose her political, economic, social and 
cultural systems, without interference by another state in any form” and 
“[Country] Report […] attack[ed] China’s political, economic, social and 
cultural systems in total violation of the above-mentioned declaration.”  
Although IOSC did not state Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
its CCRs, IOSC seems to justify that the Chinese government did accord with 
the aim of declaration. The declaration states its aim as “the promotion of 
universal respect for and observance of human rights [in the dignity and 
worth of the human person and in equality and social progress and 
standards of life] and fundamental freedoms” (United Nations General 
Assembly, 1948). For instance, IOSC presented in CCR of 1995 the Chinese 
government’s efforts in protecting the human rights of prisoners, saying 
that the Chinese prison administrators provided humanistic treatment of 
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Tibetan nun Puncog Yangji once they found she was ill, and clarifying that 
she died of illness instead of “extrajudicial killing” stated by the U.S. 
counterpart. 
The differences in human rights practices above between China and 
the U.S. probably reflect the different focuses on human rights, and 
thereby the means of promoting human rights. The U.S. emphasizes the 
universal aspect of human rights and adheres to the idea of “human rights 
above sovereignty”; while although the Chinese side acknowledges the 
universality and particularity of human rights, it emphasizes on the latter 
(Dong, 2000). Put it another way, for China it is sovereignty above human 
rights, in which human rights is regarded as part of domestic affairs (Dong, 
2000). The concrete practices of releasing Country Report, linking China’s 
human rights situations with its most-favoured nation treatment, 
preventing the repatriation of the Chinese prisoners of Korean War, were 
typically such embodiment of American government’s promotion of human 
rights. In contrast, the Chinese side considers one state has no rights to 
interfere another state’s human rights (unless severe abuse of human rights 
e.g., genocide, slave trade, racial discrimination system, pollution or 
diseases threating global security occurs) or impose their political system or 
ideological norms on another one in the name of preserving human rights. 
Because the Chinese side considers in CCRs that human rights belongs to 
domestic issues. In addition, the unique historical, cultural, and social 
conditions of each state decide that it is unrealistic to take the same 
measures of other states realizing the aim of promoting human rights, Such 
a basic understanding of human rights protection probably sets underlying 
ideology of the Sino-U.S. human rights struggle in the form of 
argumentative practices. 
In the argumentation stage, in order to prove American side’s 
accusation of Chinese human rights violation not true, IOSC mainly provided 
four arguments throughout these CCRs: 1) some of the typical and 
repetitive cases in Country Report distorted the actual situation of China’s 
human rights; 2) America disregarded that  China had made great progress 
in human rights generally; 3) America took a blind eye to its own severe 
human rights violations; and 4) the accusation of Chinese human rights was 
actually the embodiment of the hegemonism of the U.S. in essence. I will 
reconstruct the structure of these arguments below one by one. 
The first argument of IOSC was that the U.S. State Department to 
some degree distorted the actual situation of China’s human rights in its 
Country Report. IOSC revealed the faults of American opponent’s report of 
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China’s human rights practices, and refuted them by presenting the 
situation and aspects of human rights in China which was omitted, 
distorted, invented or exaggerated by the U.S.. Specifically, IOSC usually 
pointed out in its argument (the wrong, distorted or misinterpreted part of 
Country Report made by the U.S.), then provided the actual situation of the 
human rights in China, and added the neglected human rights abuses of the 
U.S. if necessary. General speaking, premises 1.1-1.11 are the major 
reasons employed by IOSC in support of Argument One, which were the 
distorted Chinese human rights practices by the U.S. government covering 
most of the civil and political rights from the right to life to the right for 
minority to enjoy their own culture. It could be observed from these 
premises that Argument One is a multiple argument, according to the 
reconstruction of argument in pragma-dialectics, supported by 11 
independent premises. For the ease of analysis, I will divide the structure 
of Argument One into 11 independent small arguments; these small 
arguments correspond to the 11 premises. I will analyse these premises one 
by one and their schematic structures as well. Here below is the 
reconstruction of first argument and its first premise: 
Argument One: The U.S. side distorted the actual situation of China’s 
human rights 
1.1 It was unreasonable to state “death penalty in China violate[d] human 
rights.” 
1.1.1 Most countries kept death penalty based on their own situations. 
1.1.2a The main human rights documents allow the death penalty for 
the “most serious crimes.” 
1.1.2b China’s death penalty “requires the prudent examination 
procedures.” 
1.1.3 America’s death penalty did not pardon the criminals who shoot 
ordinary people. 
To argue America’s accusation of China’s death penalty as unreasonable 
(1.1), IOSC mainly provides four premises (1.1.1-1.1.3) in CCRs. Based on 
the history of death penalty in the 20th century, it was not until 1980s that 
the movement of abolishing death penalty developed worldwide. Till 2005, 
128 countries (60 percent of all the countries worldwide) practiced 
abolishing death penalty, in which 81 countries (40 percent of all the 
countries worldwide) completely abolished death penalty (see Miao, 2005). 
However, at the same time, 1990s, particularly from 1993 to 1999, was also 
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the peak period in terms of death sentence and the execution of death 
penalty. Compared with 2,766.5, the average number of those who were 
sentenced to death from 1980 to 1999, this number reached up to over 
3,000 from 1993 to 1999, and to 7,107 in 1996 (see Miao, 2005).   
It can be observed from the above the statistics that although 
abolishing death penalty was increasingly accepted and practiced since 
1980s, such movement was not smoothly developed in 1990s. Additionally, 
the Sino-U.S. human rights debate also occurred in 1990s, particularly CCRs 
in the current study issued during the peak period of death sentence and 
execution of death penalty. Thereby, premise 1.1.1 probably accords with 
the actual situation of the death penalty in 1990s. Similarly, IOSC also 
seems to consider 1.1.2a and 1.1.2b are relevant to the argument 1.1 based 
on the Criminal Law of China. Here 1.1.2a and 1.1.2b constitute a 
coordinative argument, working together to support premise 1.1. 
America’s preservation of death penalty (1.1.3) in some states also 
indicates that America did not abolish death penalty. 1.1.2a, 1.1.2b and 
1.1.3 show that both the U.S. and China preserve the death penalty. The 
argument of 1.1 employs symptomatic scheme as the premises are the 
demonstration of features of death penalty. 
1.2 “[S]upressing dissents” was not true. 
1.2.1 American government confused right and wrong taking the Chinese 
government’s punishment of the criminals who threaten national 
security and social order as violating human rights of criminals. 
1.2.1.1 The arrest of Hu Shigen, Wang Dan, Wang Wanxing and Wei 
Jingsheng was due to their crime of overthrowing government or 
disturbing public order. 
1.2.2 American government accused the stipulation of China’s 
constitution of not impairing the interests of the state. 
1.2.3 American government regarded China’s system of multiparty 
cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) as one-party politics. 
1.2.4 Country Report considered National People’s Congress (NPC) had 
no right to make policy or dismiss leaders. 
1.2.5 Country Report stated village elections in China had no ability to 
change the government peacefully. 
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1.2.6 The U.S. side regarded the Chinese government’s disapproval of 
the Chinese citizens’ denial of the political system under the 
leadership of CPC as violating citizens’ rights of freedom. 
1.2.6.1 The U.S. side criticized the prohibition of the use of using the 
Internet to conduct activities threatening national security. 
1.2.6.2 The U.S. side criticized that association formation needed to 
be approved by the government. 
1.2.6.3 The U.S. side took the Chinese government’s requirement for 
journalists of keeping national secrets as violating the freedom of 
speech and publication. 
1.2.7 “China’s law on the restriction of citizens’ execution of freedom 
[was] in accordance with international practices.” 
1.2.7.1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights regulates 
the restriction of freedom for security and public health or 
morality. 
1.2.8 “No countries in the world allow[ed] their citizens to enjoy the 
right of liberty without any restrictions.” 
1.2.8.1 The U.S. code stipulates the punishment for the speech, 
press, assembly and association aiming at overthrowing American 
government. 
Suppression of dissidents is the one of the most criticized and the 
most significant aspects by the U.S. as it more likely involves the legitimacy 
of state power compared with other aspects distorted by the U.S.; IOSC 
thereby employs more arguments (totally eight from 1.2.1 to 1.2.8), 
compared with other distorted aspects, to refute Country Report. IOSC at 
the very beginning points out the fault of the U.S. side failing to distinguish 
the protection of human rights from violation of human rights (1.2.1), 
saying “Country Report accused China of punishing the crimes endangering 
national security as ‘violation of human rights’ ” (CCR, 1996). To prove the 
fault (1.2.1), IOSC provided several cases (Hu, Wang, Wei, etc. in 1.2.1.1) 
as these exemplifications were distorted in Country Report. For example, in 
the case of Hu Shigen, IOSC stated Hu was “by no means the ‘prisoner 
sentenced for [his] thinking’ or ‘political prisoner’, rather he “was found 
guilty of illegally setting up a secret organization”, demonstrating his 
anti-government plot with “armed forces department” and his secret links 
with anti-China organizations abroad (CCR, 1995). Wang Dan, Wang 
Wanxing and Wei Jingsheng’s cases were similar to that of Hu. Here 1.2.1 
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and 1.2.1.1 constitute a subordinate argument, which is as a part of 
argument 1.2. 
Besides the individual “dissidents”, IOSC also argues for other 
distorted aspects of political system involving freedom of speech in Country 
Report. The following five premises (1.2.2-1.2.6) demonstrate the 
distorted report of the restriction on change of the government in Country 
Report. IOSC points out that Country Report criticized China’s constitution 
(1.2.2), multi-party cooperation and political consultative system (1.2.3) 
and NPC (1.2.4), village election (1.2.5) and finally CPC’s prohibition of the 
Chinese citizens’ denial of China’s political system (1.2.6) through speech 
(1.2.6.1), association (1.2.6.2), and revealing national secrets (1.2.6.3) in 
CCRs. As IOSC probably regards in CCRs that the U.S. government tried to 
criticize and change China’s political system through the promotion of 
citizens’ freedom of speech, and also through the entitlement of the state 
authority freedom of revising the current system, Country Report was not 
simply about the demonstration of human rights of other states, it probably 
involved the dissatisfaction of the political system of China at that time, 
and thus the possible change of system of the latter for the promotion of 
human rights. That is more likely the reason why the Chinese government 
regarded Country Report as interference of other states’ domestic affairs, 
and thus as the representation of America’s hegemony in 1990s.  
Based on these premises of false message, IOSC adds another two 
premises (1.2.7 and 1.2.8) to prove why the listed distorted cases 
mentioned above (1.2.1-1.2.6) in Country Report were legal and China’s 
regulation of freedom was reasonable: China’s regulation of freedom 
accorded with international practices (1.2.7), and all the countries had 
restriction on freedom (1.2.8). For 1.2.7, IOSC takes international law on 
human rights, such as International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) (1.2.7.1), as authority to defend its regulation of freedom. 
Specifically, articles from 18 to 22 in ICCPR regulates “the restriction on 
the execution of the rights of freedom like religious belief, press, assembly 
and association” on the condition of preserving “the national security and 
public security, public order or protect[ing] public health or morality as 
well as others’ rights and freedom” (CCR, 1996). Similarly, 1.2.8 also 
resorts to appeal to authority of regulation in American law on the 
punishment of the speech and activities overthrowing the government 
(1.2.8.1) to exemplify besides China, other countries, such as the 
protagonist the U.S. also stipulates the similar handling of the speech, 
press, assembly and association threatening the national security. These 
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two premises (1.2.7 and 1.2.8) work together to demonstrate why China’s 
handling of the “dissidents” as criminals who endanger the national 
security was reasonable and thus was the protection of other ordinary 
Chinese citizens’ human rights. 
  These two premises (1.2.7 and 1.2.8) and the previous six ones 
(1.2.1-1.2.6) support the America’s accusation of the Chinese 
government’s suppression of dissidents as abuse of human rights, as false 
description (1.2). They work alone by themselves to support an argument, 
accordingly constitutes the multiple argument. They all belong to the 
symptomatic scheme. 
1.3 America invented stories of mistreatment of prisoners. 
1.3.1 Prisoners Puncog Yangji, Wang Juntao, Liu Gang, Ren Wanding, 
Zeng Jingmu were well received humanistic treatment. 
1.3.2 The video of the kidney transplants operation from an executed 
prisoner made up by Harry Wu and Sue Loyd Roberts, was actually the 
patient Chen Zuchuan’s operation of replacement of mitral valve. 
Mistreatment of prisoners is another topics criticized by the U.S.. 
IOSC demonstrated the distorted events of prisoners Puncog, Wang, Liu, 
Ren and Zeng made by Country Report, and presented the unknown side of 
these prisoners’ lives (1.3.1). For instance, IOSC in CCRs argued that Liu’s 
arm was not beaten in prison, and Liu was never beaten in prison based on 
the investigation of China Society for Human Rights into the prison 
administration and Liu himself. Actually, Liu often played volleyball, bridge 
and the investigators saw Liu with a strong physique with their own eyes. 
This was also confirmed by five American journalists after their visits to 
prison (CCR, 1995). IOSC also stated the weight change of Liu and his life in 
prison. He weighed more than 80 kg then (1995) compared with 69 kg at 
that time of last year (1994) and 65 kg when he was sent to prison; he “took 
part in four volleyball competitions last year and he regularly receives visits 
by relatives” (CCR, 1995).  
The case of Zeng, according to IOSC, was not that the authority in 
Fujian province refused to provide medical service for his illness of 
pneumonia and arrested him at home due to illegal religious activities by 
the U.S. side, but that he had no illness at all, and the arrestment was due 
to his “illegal assembling” and “disturbing social order” (CCR, 1997). Wang 
Juntao’s hepatitis also received the treatment by the best doctors in China 
and he was sent to America for treatment (CCR, 1995) and Ren Wanding, 
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since he entered prison, received regular physical check-ups and treatment 
when he was sick (CCR, 1996).  
The video of the kidney transplant operation from an executed 
prisoner was also not true (1.3.2). It was actually the operation of 
replacement of mitral valve for an ordinary patient. IOSC clarified it by 
disclosing how the two people Wu and Roberts produced their video. They 
cheated a Chinese doctor by saying “Roberts’ uncle needed a kidney 
transplant and asks the doctor to buy one on behalf of Roberts, and also 
indicates an executed criminal’s kidney might be OK” (CRR, 1995). The 
doctor refused their requirement with the reason that “organ trading is 
forbidden in China” (CRR, 1995). Out of courtesy to the two visitors’ 
requirement, the doctor allowed them to visit an operating room where a 
patient named Chen Zuchuan was being conducted an operation of 
replacing a mitral mechanical valve with artificial one. The two visitors 
videotaped the operation, which became widespread and distorted later as 
the “kidney transplant from an executed prisoner” in western countries 
(CRR, 1995). That was the actual situation of how the video came into being 
based on IOSC’s clarification in CCR.  
These cases in 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 all work independently as premises to 
refute the claim of mistreatment of prisoners in Country Report, thereby 
constitute a multiple argument. The schemes here are symptomatic. 
1.4 It was incorrect to accuse that the Chinese administration restricts the 
freedom of religion. 
1.4.1 “[I]nsufficient Bible copies” and “mosque construction 
restriction” in Xinjiang were not true.  
1.4.1.1 The number of Bible copies was larger than that of the Chinese 
Christians, and the number of mosques per Muslims in Xinjiang was 
twice as large as that in Gulf areas. 
1.4.2 It was wrong that America called those criminals who committed 
crimes under the guise of religion, and hence were punished in 
accordance with law as “prisoners of conscience.” 
1.4.2.1 The activists in cult “Family of Jesus” were not “prisoner of 
conscience”, but the law-breaking criminals.  
1.4.2.2 “The Shouters” was also a cult that committed crimes of 
anti-social and anti-government activities.  
1.4.2.3 America government also supressed cults. 
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1.4.3 It was arrogant of America to state “party members cannot 
become religious believers.” 
1.4.3.1a Chinese party members adhered to atheism⎯Marxism. 
1.4.3.1b Individuals who were willing to become a [different] 
religious believer could choose not to join CPC or quit the party. 
Religion is probably another aspect of the most frequently criticized 
abuses of human rights in Country Report. Similar to the response to the 
accusation of dissident suppression, IOSC also challenges the U.S. that the 
latter regarded China’s punishment of those criminals in the name of 
religion as the restriction on the activists’ freedom of religion. On both 
occasions, the U.S. regarded China’s criminals as human rights activists and 
the Chinese government’s punishment of them according to the law as 
abuse of human rights of these activists. To refute the view of the U.S. side, 
IOSC pointed out three wrong cases in its Country Report: insufficient Bible 
copies and mosque (1.4.1), “prisoners of conscience” (1.4.2) and party 
members’ restriction on religious belief (1.4.3).  
For the first one, IOSC employed statistics of comparison (1.4.1.1) in 
refuting the claim of insufficient bibles and mosques, that is, the number of 
Bible copes was larger than that of the Chinese Christians and the number 
of mosques per Muslin in Xinjiang Autonomous Region was twice as that in 
Gulf area (CCR, 1995).   
IOSC argued that the punishment of “prisoners of conscience” was 
also wrong (1.4.2) as “Family of Jesus” (1.4.2.1) and “the Shouters” 
(1.4.2.2) listed in Country Report were all “cults”, the criminal religious 
organizations in the name of religion, not the U.S. called “prisoners of 
conscience”. For example, “Family of Jesus” occupied public land illegally, 
arranged men and women to marry without legal procedures, and deprived 
the children of parental care and protection, which went against the law 
(CCR, 1995). It was the same with “the Shouters” for its illegal activities 
(CCR, 1996).  
The last criticism concerning the restriction on religious belief in 
China is the restriction on religious belief of members of CPC. To refute 
such criticism by the U.S., IOSC pointed out that members of CPC believed 
in Marxism (1.4.3.1a) and anyone who believed in other religion could quit 
CPC (1.4.3.1b) (CCR, 1996). IOSC represented American counterpart as 
ignorant and ill-informed by identifying the latter’s “lack of understanding 
of CPC’s religious belief”. These three premises (1.4.1-1.4.3) work 
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independently taking the function of supporting argument 1.4; thereby 
they form a multiple argument. 
1.5 It was also invalid for the U.S. to state that China lacks due process of 
fair trial. 
1.5.1 America distorted China’s laws of criminal procedure claiming that 
“[the court] had no necessity to assign a counsel to the defendant” and 
“the defense counsel could not be hired seven days earlier than the 
trial”. 
1.5.1.1 Article 110 in Chinese laws of criminal procedure actually 
stipulates that “[a] copy of indictment made by people’s 
procuratorate shall be sent to the defendant at least seven days 
before the trial, and the people’s court inform defendant that he 
(she) could authorize defence counsel, or the court designates 
another defence counsel for the defendant if necessary.” 
1.5.2 Country Report played Wu Hongda’s case up stating “forced 
confession” was used and “defence counsel could only be selected 
from the lists examined by the government.” 
1.5.2.1 Wu’s case was heard by the intermediate people’s court of 
Wuhan city in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. 
Lack of fair trial procedure is also criticized by the U.S. government. 
IOSC challenges the criticism (1.5) by arguing for American counterpart’s 
misunderstanding of China’s Law of Criminal Procedure (1.5.1) and 
specifying Wu’s case (1.5.2). IOSC clarified the specification concerning the 
assignment of lawyers and time regulation by providing the stipulation in 
Law of Criminal Procedure (1.5.1.1), in which the law not only requires that 
the court assign counsel to the defendant, but also demand that at least 
seven days before the trial, a copy of indictment shall be sent to the 
defendant (CCR 1997). Premise 1.5.1 thus provides the evidence of 
American counterpart’ misreported description of China’s criminal 
procedure in law; 1.5.1.1 presents the evidence of the actual stipulation of 
trial procedure in Law of Criminal Procedure. In this case of fair trial 
regulation, the latter functions as the reason in support of the first; 
therefore, they constitute a subordinate argument.  
For the premise of 1.5.2, IOSC also clarified the U.S. counterpart’s 
misinterpretation of Wu’s case by demonstrating the due procedure. For 
instance, IOSC demonstrated that “Wu’s counsel was chosen by himself 
based on the stipulation of qualification of defence counsel and also based 
on the lists of law firms provided by American Embassy to China” (CCR, 
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1996) and Wu was satisfied with the counsel’s defense for him and wrote to 
show his appreciation (CCR, 1996). An official from American Embassy to 
China, on site of the trial, also expressed his (her) surprise to see that the 
counsel defended Wu quite actively. Additionally, the court informed Wu of 
the right to appeal if he was not satisfied with the judgement; however, Wu 
gave up and accepted it (CCR, 1996). IOSC presented the evidences from 
the defendant Wu, Wu’s defence counsel and an American official to justify 
the due procedures of Wu’s case and clarified the U.S. side’s distorted 
report of Wu’s case criticizing China’s lack of due procedures of fair trial.  
The premises 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 work as a multiple argument (1.5). 
Similar to the argument type formed by 1.5.1 and 1.5.1.1, 1.5.2 and 1.5.2.1 
also constitute a subordinate argument. The schemes here are symptomatic 
ones, that is, the demonstration of featured human rights practices, either 
in the quotation of distorted description by the U.S. or clarification by 
IOSC. 
1.6 The U.S. distorted the facts claiming that the Chinese government 
casually arrested foreign citizens. 
1.6.1 The arrest of foreigner Ngawang Choephel and James Peng was 
due to their crimes, in which the former engaged in espionage in 
Tibet in the guise of collecting Tibetan folk dance art, and the latter 
misappropriated company funds. 
The casual arrest of foreigners is also criticized by the U.S. (1.6). To 
refute such criticism IOSC argued the arrest of Ngawang Choephel and 
James Peng was due to their crimes (1.6.1).  IOSC provided the evidence of 
Ngawang Choephel’s crimes: “he was the dance teacher of the Dalai Lama 
‘government in exile,’ was dispatched by the Dalai clique, carried funds 
and equipment provided by foreign countries, and gathered intelligence 
information in the name of collecting Tibetan folk dance art” (CCR, 1997). 
The Chinese public security organ obtained the evidence of his spy 
activities in Lhasa, Shanlin, Linzhi and Xigaze and arrested him; Ngawang 
Choephel also admitted his crimes of espionage (CCR, 1997).  
James Peng’s arrest was because of his economic crimes in which he, 
as the general manager of Sino-Australian Lvping company, transferred 
HK$800,000 (investment remittance of this company) to his own personal 
company Kangya company in Hong Kong, and later occupied 290,000 yuan in 
1992 when he was the Chairman of Lvping company (CCR, 1997).  
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It could be observed that IOSC employed the two cases to clarify why 
the two foreigners were arrested by the Chinese government. It was not the 
casual arrest, but the foreigners committed crimes which violated China’s 
laws. As to the argumentation structure, the premises 1.6 and 1.6.1 
constitute a subordinate argument, and IOSC again employs symptomatic 
scheme to demonstrate the crimes of foreigners in China in CCR. 
1.7 [It was not true for the U.S. stating that the Chinese government] 
forced persons released after they served their sentence to work in 
state-owned enterprises (SOE) for supervision. 
1.7.1a (Before the end of 1990s and given its reliable coverage of SOE) 
many people were willing to work there. 
1.7.1b The Chinese government helped people solve their employment 
problems through releasing documents that require local governments 
and enterprises provide employment assistance for persons released 
after they served their sentence and those who completed 
re-education through labour. 
 In order to refute American side’s misrepresentation of the Chinese 
government’s effort in employment for individuals serving their sentence 
or completing re-education through labour, IOSC responded with the 
demonstration of the employment situation in China in 1990s (1.7.1a) to 
contextualize why these people were sent to work in SOE. SOE for most 
Chinese were “iron rice bowls” in 1990s, and people working in SOE enjoyed 
better social security if compared with those in some other jobs did, say 
peasants. Given such social situation it was probably not the government 
supervised workers there, but people were more likely to work there at 
their own will.  
Besides, in order to handle the job problems of prisoners serving their 
sentence and those completing re-education through labour, the Chinese 
central government required local governments and enterprises to provide 
assistance for the employment of these people (1.7.1b). IOSC represents 
the employment of prisoners in SOE as the Chinese government’s assistance 
and effort in solving the employment problems of prisoners, instead of 
controlling and supervising them.  
In CCRs, IOSC employs positive meaning of Chinese government’s 
effort in solving prisoners’ job issue for the refutation of U.S. counterpart’s 
wrong understanding of human rights of prisoners in China. People’s 
willingness to work in SOE and the government’s assistance to the 
employment of released people in prison and re-education-through-labour 
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centres (1.7.1a and 1.7.1b) together support the argument of the false 
report of the Chinese government’s enforcement of imposing supervision on 
released prisoners and re-educators in labour camps (1.7), in which the 
scheme is also symptomatic. 
1.8 The claim was self-contradictory that Country Report accused Chinese 
citizens have no freedom of movement, and at the same time accused 
the negative effects of freedom of movement. 
1.9 [It was not proper for] Country Report criticizing the gender 
discrimination in China. 
1.9.1 China’s performances in pursuing gender equality in politics, 
education and employment were better than America’s. 
1.10 American government took “cracking down on crimes of abducting 
women and children” as “human rights abuse of the Chinese 
government.” 
1.11 Country Report used various unclear source of information which could 
not be verified. 
For American government’s accusation of no freedom of movement, 
gender discrimination and human rights abuse of the Chinese government, 
IOSC refuted by pointing out the self-contradictory aspect (1.8), by 
changing the criticism as praise since China did better than the U.S. did in 
gender equality (1.9), and by clarifying the actual situation of the Chinese 
government’s effort in cracking down on the activities of abducting women 
and children (1.10). For most of the materials and content concerning the 
abuses of China’s human rights, IOSC also pointed out the unclear original 
sources to challenge the reliability of American government’s report (1.11). 
For example, IOSC argued that America’s report had cited lots of sources 
like “it is said that”, “it is believed” and “without being proved”, which 
were not based on solid facts (CCR, 1996). Premises 1.8, 1.9 and 1.11 are 
single arguments in which each of them functions as the only premise to 
support the claim (Argument One); the schemes of the four premises are 
also symptomatic ones. Given all these premises (1.1-1.11) contributing to 
the argument of the distorted representation of China’s human rights, I 
reconstruct structure of Argument One (Figure 1) as below: 
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Figure 1 IOSC’s argument structure of America’s distortion of China’s human rights 
 
Besides falsifying and correcting the distorted human rights practices 
made by the U.S. counterpart, IOSC further balanced the actual situations 
of human rights in China by presenting the progress of human rights made 
by the Chinese government (Argument Two) and the problems of human 
rights in the U.S. (Argument Three), both of which were neglected by the 
U.S. government. Here below is the second argument. 
Argument Two: Country Report disregarded the great progress of 
China’s human rights 
2.1 China basically solved the food and clothing problems. 
2.2 Economically, Chinese’s income grew. 
2.3 In education, nine-year compulsory education was basically universalized, 
and enrolment rate increased and illiteracy was almost wiped out. 
2.4 Politically, numerous laws were issued and direct elections at the level 
of village were implemented. 
   2.4.1 Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Elderly, 
Law on Lawyers and Administrative Punishment Law were released and 
Law of Critical Procedure was revised. 
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To refute the abuse of human rights of China by the U.S. government 
and also to offer a balanced description of the actual situation of China’s 
human rights, IOSC also demonstrated the general progressive aspect of 
China’s human rights practices which were neglected by the U.S. 
counterpart. IOSC demonstrated China’s resolving food and clothing 
problems in the past decades (2.1), its economic development (2.2), the 
removal of illiteracy and universalization of compulsory education (2.3) and 
the progress of democracy and legal system (2.4 and 2.4.1).  
Most of these progressive aspects were demonstrated through 
statistics in CRR. For instance, IOSC stated that “China’s GDP soared to 
5,773.3 billion yuan in 1995, an increase of 10.2 percent over last year; […] 
attendance rate of junior high school reached 78.4 percent, a growth of 4.6 
percent over last year; […] 5 million people shook off poverty and 4.76 
million people rid themselves of illiteracy in 1995” (CCR, 1996). In political 
system, IOSC presented that “over 98 percent of China’s established 
neighbourhood committees or villagers’ groups, in which 97 percent of 
neighbourhood committee adopt the method of direct voting” (CCR, 1997). 
IOSC also exemplified three laws newly released or one revised in China 
(2.4.1) for the protection of the rights of lawyers and other Chinese 
citizens.  
These progresses (2.1 to 2.4) could independently support Argument 
Two (the neglected aspect of human rights in China by the U.S.); thereby, 
they constitute a multiple argument, in which the scheme is also 
symptomatic one. I thus construct the argument structure of the 
progressive aspect of human rights in China which is neglected in Country 
Report (Figure 2) as below: 
Figure 2 IOSC’s argument structure of America’s disregard of great  
progress in China’s human rights 
 
 
 
Argument Three: America took a blind eye to its own severe human 
rights violations 
3.1 (American government disregarded its human rights abuses at home.) 
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3.1.1 The number of poor Americans increased. 
3.1.2 Life security of Americans was threatened. 
3.1.3 Racial and gender discrimination was widespread. 
3.2 (American government disregarded its human rights abuse 
internationally.) 
3.2.1 America refused to accede international convention concerning 
human rights. 
3.2.1.1 America did not accede the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination and the International Convention on the Suppression 
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. 
Besides the neglect of the Chinese human rights, IOSC also revealed 
America’s blindness to its own severe human rights violations (Argument 
Three). It mainly demonstrated America’s abuses of human rights at home 
(3.1) and abroad (3.2). Similar to the use of facts in Argument Two, IOSC 
also resorted to statistics and individual cases in justifying the abuses of 
human rights by the U.S. counterpart. For the human rights abuses at 
home, IOSC presented the number of homeless Americans from the U.S. 
Census Bureau with an increase of 1.3 million from 1992 to 1993 (CCR, 
1995) to demonstrate the increase of poor Americans (3.1.1).  
To demonstrate Americans’ lives were threatened in the environment 
of potential violence (3.1.2), IOSC adopted the statistics from American 
administration and mass media in CCR issued in 1995. It said, for example, 
“according to the statistics of the U.S. Office of Education, 21 percent of 
the American students go to school with guns in the total 12.5 million 
American middle school students. America’s prisoners are 1.3 million with 
the ratio of 519/100,000, which is the highest in the world based on the 
news from Reuters on 12 September 1994” (CCR, 1995).  
For the racial and gender discrimination (3.1.3), IOSC contrasted the 
differences between American blacks and whites in unemployment, 
education and death ratio. That is, IOSC tried to point out that there was 
obvious racial discrimination, particularly among the white and the black in 
the access to the most basic service. For instance, IOSC demonstrated 
“American government admits that the unemployment rate of American 
blacks in the past 20 years, is twice or three times than that of the white, 
and the number of the black with higher education is only half of the white 
with higher education, […] the death rate of the black is 1.77 percent, 
twice that of the white counterpart (0.82 percent)” (CCR, 1995).  
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For the abuses of human rights of the U.S. abroad, IOSC demonstrated 
the U.S. counterpart’s violation of international practices and human rights 
laws (3.2.1). For instance, IOSC stated that “the United States refused to 
accede to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination and the International Convention on the Suppression 
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid” (CCR, 1995).  IOSC employed 
the case or example of the U.S. government’s refusal of acceding 
international human rights conventions, instead of statistics to prove that 
the U.S. did not follow the international human rights laws. The premises of 
abuses of human rights of America both home and abroad constitute a 
multiple argument (Argument Three); accordingly, I build the structure of 
Argument Three (Figure 3) as below: 
Figure 3 IOSC’s argument structure of America’s blindness to its own human rights violations 
 
Argument Four: Accusation of China’s human rights was the 
embodiment of the hegemonism of the U.S. in essence 
4.1 America had no legal qualification to judge other countries’ human 
rights.  
   4.1.1 America was not authorized by a specific country or international 
conference to yearly issue Country Report.  
4.2 The U.S. was to produce confrontation, pressure and change the system 
of China and destroy its social stability in the name of promoting human 
rights. 
4.2.1a Country Report was “the political tool” of America’s human rights 
diplomacy for “the political need of the U.S.in the cold war”. 
4.2.1b Country Report attacked and defamed China, and interfered the 
domestic affairs of China. 
4.3 Accusation of China’s human rights “abuses” went against basic norms 
of sovereignty equality and non-interference. 
4.3.1a “Human rights were domestic affairs.” 
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4.3.1b “The core of human rights is equality.” 
4.3.1c Each state had different understanding of human rights and 
needed to be respected due to the diversity of the reality of the 
world. 
4.3.1d America’s Country Report imposed the concepts of value and 
human rights of its own on other states. 
4.3.1e Country Report violated the UN’s declaration named Declaration 
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States 
and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty (1965), the 
UN Charter (1945), the declaration passed by World Conference on 
Human Rights Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993) 
and the UN’s resolution Act of Strengthening the International 
Cooperation in Human Rights (1996), which emphasized equality and 
cooperation among countries to avoid distortion of human rights and 
confrontation. 
To further reveal American government’s hegemonism and power 
politics behind human rights criticism (Argument Four), IOSC pointed out 
that such a right of issuing other countries’ report on human rights had 
never been “justified” (4.1). This is because, according to IOSC, the U.S. 
side never showed “which country or which meeting had granted the U.S. 
the “Global Judge of Human Rights” (4.1.1) (CCR, 1995). Besides, IOSC also 
revealed the aim of the U.S. to change the system of China and its stability 
(4.2) by taking advantage reporting the latter’s human rights “abuses,” 
which could date back to America’s human rights diplomacy as part of 
anti-communism in the cold war (4.2.1a). Changing the system was mainly 
based on the change of social order and criticisms of China’s political 
system in the aspects of “suppressing dissidents” (1.2), such as restriction 
of freedom of speech, NPC’s inability to change the leaders or make the 
policies, though IOSC did not detail it in 4.2.1b.  
This probably contributes to explain why the Chinese government 
regarded America’s Country Report not just as a human rights record of 
China, but as interference of its sovereignty and threat of national security, 
which was the representation of power politics and hegemonism.  
The last reason offered by IOSC also concerned itself with the 
legitimacy of content of the report, that is, Country Report went against 
the international conventions of state equality and non-interference (4.3). 
IOSC argued that human rights were domestic issue (4.3.1a), stating “the 
issue of human rights is the domestic affairs governed by state government, 
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and each state should take efforts to preserve and promote human rights at 
home, instead of eagerly criticizing and teaching other states” (CCR, 1995). 
Additionally, IOSC demonstrated the pursuit of equality in human rights 
(4.3.1b) and respect for basic conditions of each state for its development 
of human rights (4.3.1c). As it suggested that “due to differences in the 
historical background, social system, cultural tradition and the level of 
economic development, the concrete measures of preserving human rights 
will be different and the understanding of human rights is also different” 
(CCR, 1995). Besides, America’s Country Report violated the universal 
principles on human rights (4.3.1e) and imposed its own human rights 
values on other countries (4.3.1d).  
Premises 4.1 and 4.1.1 constitute a subordinate argument, and it is 
the same for 4.2 and 4.3 and their corresponding sub-arguments. Premises 
4.2.1a and 4.2.1b form a coordinate argument of 4.2, which is the same 
argument type of 4.3. While for the whole Argument Four, premises 4.1, 
4.2 and 4.3 constitute a multiple type, each of which work independently 
to support Argument Four. Premises 4.1 and 4.3 employ symptomatic 
schemes; while 4.2.1a and 4.2.1b the causal schemes. The argument 
structure of Argument Four (Figure 4) is constructed as follows: 
Figure 4 IOSC’s argument structure of America’s hegemonism behind Country Report 
 
 
The four arguments (Argument One to Argument Four) together 
support the Chinese government’s standpoint in CCRs that China did not 
have the human rights abuses distorted in County Report issued by the U.S. 
government and rather the criticism of other state’s human rights was the 
embodiment of American counterpart’s hegemonism and power politics. 
These four arguments as sub-standpoints are further classified into 
subordinate and coordinate argument structures. 
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The concluding stage of the Chinese government’s argumentation 
ended with its proposal for cooperation and dialogue instead of 
confrontation in the name of human rights to settle the different opinions 
of human rights issue. This was stated in CCR in 1995 and 1997 that “the 
cooperation based on equality”, “dialogue and resistance against 
confrontation and pressure imposition” among different countries in the 
human rights “conform[ed] to the trend of history” and IOSC hoped America 
to “stop issuing Country Report”. 
5. Concluding Discussion 
I take the case of Sino-U.S. human rights debate in 1990s as an 
example, particularly the Chinese government’s response to American 
counterpart’s criticism of its human rights practices, address how 
international political discourse can be analysed in an argumentative 
perspective, that is, how the Chinese government argued with American 
counterpart to defend its human rights.  
The finding shows that the Chinese government, generally speaking, 
refuted the U.S. counterpart’s criticism of its human rights with reasoning. 
Specifically, IOSC argued the U.S. side’s distortion of the actual situation of 
China’s human rights, its neglect of the great progress of Chinese human 
rights and its own severe human rights violations, and mostly such 
accusation of China’s human rights as hegemonism in essence. Through 
these arguments, the Chinese government constructs the U.S. as a state of 
practicing power politics and unfriendly, deviant actor worldwide. The 
Chinese side employs complicated and diverse argument types, most of 
which are multiple ones, and symptomatic argument schemes. 
Obviously, China’s employment of the international discourse of 
argumentation in human rights to some degree seems effective in 
communication with international audience. Such practice is in accordance 
with the appeal to the need of westerners in the field of international 
politics and communication. In the pluralistic international communities, 
China needs to take consideration of western audience, their way of 
thinking and speaking and western social science traditions, and to adopt 
accordingly international discourse accepted by the latter (Wu, 2015; Zhao, 
2006a, 2006b; Zheng, 2015). As the argumentation is the long tradition in 
western countries and argumentative discourse is favoured in various fields 
of western societies, argumentative change of China’s international 
discourse based on evidence instead of morality and position, has come into 
being and worked effectively. The successive defeats of American 
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representatives’ proposal of examining China’s human rights (Xu & Wang, 
2001) and the reform of the UN Human Rights Council is particularly based 
on such argumentative discourse by the Chinese government.  
Thus, such argumentative discourse is likely to be an alternative for 
the less powerful groups (states) to preserve their rights and equality and 
prevent for the power abuse of those more powerful ones in the 
international occasions. I thereby look forward to more studies focusing on 
the discourse of dominated groups and examining the effect of discourse 
analysis in argumentative perspective. 
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